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ABSTRACT
An Intrusion detection system is generally considered to be any system
designed to detect attempts compromise the integrity, confidentiality or
availability of the protected network and associated computer systems. Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) aims to detect attempted compromises by monitoring
network traffic for indications that an attempted compromise is in progress, or an
internal system is behaving in a manner which indicates it may already be
compromised. A host based IDS (HIDS) monitors a single system for signs of
compromise.
The vast majority of worms and other successful cyber attacks are made possible
by vulnerabilities in a small number of common operating system services.
Attackers are opportunistic. They take the easiest and most convenient route and
exploit the best-known flaws with the most effective and widely available attack
tools. They count on organizations not fixing the problems, and they often attack
indiscriminately, scanning the Internet for any vulnerable systems. The easy and
destructive spread of worms, such as Blaster, Slammer, and Code Red, can be
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1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY
This report is written as a pre-requisite for undergraduate students to
complete the studies. Intrusion Systems is chosen as my title for the final year
project as it could help me to enhance and in-depth with all the theories I have
learnt during my years in study.
There is a need for Intrusion Detection System in current local area networks to
report security incidents and protect the network against intrusions from the
Internet. The rates of intrusions and security incidents have increased
dramatically in the last few years. CERT/CC, the Coordination Centre of the
Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon University, has
recorded a doubling of both software vulnerabilities and reported security
incidents every year since 1999. In the first nine months of this year, 1820
software vulnerabilities were reported to CERT. During the same period, 34754
incidents were reported (CERT 2001).
This study is so important as to add more research and knowledge to the most
crucial network problems exist nowadays. These problems need serious attention.
Those limitations exist needs serious R&D to enhance existing system. Leakage is
never allowed in any Intrusion Detection System.
Although there a lot of Intrusion Detection Systems currently exist, this system
still differs from others. Of course, the main characteristics or criteria of IDS still
the same, differences is there. This systems developed for those organization or
small network that needs a security system that is less expensive but still efficient.
The simplicity of this system makes it easy to be implemented and cheaper to
purchase. Furthermore, those small organizations will definitely needs a security
system that couldcatertheirneeds of security.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
As computer systems and the Internet have grown in size, complexity and
usage the demands placed upon those responsible for ensuring the continued
operation and security ofthese systems has also grown. This has lead to a demand
for automated systems for detecting malicious activity on both individual hosts
and networks. In line with our capitalistic society users crave for a system that
could really protect their network. Especially those institutions that need a high
level of security etc financial institution. This has lead to the development of a
range of Intrusion Detection Systems. Some of these systems are available as free
open source applications, while others are offered as commercial products.
Figure 1 below shows the virus attacks around the world monitored by a group of
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From both figures shown above, we could see how fast and hazard these attacks
could spread. From quite a tiny size of attack, it grew immensely to a huge
number ofattacks just in24hours period. And this needs very serious attention.
With the existing of current IDS technology, these kinds of attacks still increase
day by day. Which inother words, what we could argue is, whether those systems
is applicable orefficient as it should be? Does it cater the needs of security? Or is
it just another system that adds cost to an organization. From here, we could see
that there is a lot of room of improvements needed. Whether in the development
of IDS or in the development of human understanding in malicious activity and
IDS technology.
The other problem statement is that Firewall is just not sufficient. Thus, when
installing a firewall, the first thing it does is stops ALL communication. The
firewall administrator then carefully adds "rules" that allow specific types of
traffic to go through the firewall. For example, a typical corporate firewall
allowing access to the Internet would stop all UDP and ICMP datagram traffic,
stops incoming TCP connections, but allows outgoing TCP connections. This
stops all incoming connections from Internet hackers, but still allows internal
users to connect in the outgoing direction.
A firewall is simply a fence around our network, with a couple of well chosen
gates. Afence has no capability ofdetecting somebody trying to break in (such as
digging ahole underneath it), nor does a fence know if somebody coming through
the gate is allowed in. It simply restricts access to the designated points.
1.3 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
Because of the increasing occurrences of network intrusions, IDS
technologies have developed further in the last few years. There have been a
number of developments in the networking area, e.g. move to switched networks
and emergence of new security protocols, like IPsec. Some of these technologies
have made the protection of network traffic easier, but the use of encryption has
also made it more difficult to detect patterns in the IP packets. Enhancements are
being made into network protocols, e.g. ICMP Traceback message, and
functionality is being added to network equipment, to turn network devices into
'active network1 so that the intruders can be located and the intrusion contained.
The main objectives of this project are to develop a prototype of Intrusion
Detection system that is efficient and needs less cost. As known, current IDS
technology is expensive and needs a lot of training for staff before being
implemented. This project will try to cater these problems.
In this research, I will focus on the development of an Intrusion Detection system
using an open sourcecode. Visual Basic 6 is the major tool used to develop the
system. Time frame of 6 months might be inadequate, everything have to be on
schedule. Every sources and time given have to be fully utilized as this title would
consume a lot of time in researching and developing the system.
The other project objective and scope tries to "detect" and "block" malicious
activity in the network where the system is implemented. Detecting and blocking
is the essential criteria of any IDS. As this is the major role of efficient IDS. Alert
handling or legal act taken after detecting and blocking will be beyond the scope.
This project tries to focus and research in detail to these two objectives and scope.
Currently SME companies do not generally have the expertise to install and run
their own IDS system. An outsourced, fully managed solution may be applicable
where a firewall system is not adequate. In the future networks are expected to
develop into the same direction as present day 'active networks', where protocols
and the infrastructure offer more protection from intrusions.
Early intrusion attacks and, consequently, intrusion detection expertise were
developed in Unix environment. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
in the U.S. published a guide for Unix system administrators describing
techniques and actions in case their systems were targeted inan intrusion attack or
used to attack other host systems (Pienarczyk et al. 1994). Unix has traditionally
been used in the universities, because of the free licenses from AT&T. A number
of research projects in the last ten to fifteen years have concentrated on Unix
based systems and related operating system research, as an example Kumar
(1995).
An IDS also allows a company to efficiently manage its incident analysis
resources by centralizing its attack records and by giving the analyst a quick and
easy way to spot new trends and patterns and to identify threats to the network
across multiple network segments. This report will also try to give the reader




Research into intrusion detection up to four years ago has been
summarised by Axelsson (1998). There has been a marked shift from host-based
intrusion detection systems to network-based systems but the difficulty of
tracking transactions in a fast network with encrypted traffic has lead into a
hybrid system of IDS. There is a need for both policybased and anomaly based
detection. Axelsson prefers non-realtime detection and accurate reporting of
events that happened, rather than the IDS issuing an immediate but vague warning
(1998,pp.l2-13).
In his later research Axelsson (2000, pp. 8-9) classifies ID systems into three
categories, basedon the type of intrusion the system most easilydetects:
o well known intrusions with a static pattern
o generalisable intrusions, exploiting flaws in the attacked system
o unknown intrusions
Axelsson has dictated a trend towards increasing security and interoperability of
the IDS, and a trend towards distributed intrusion detection in larger
environments. The number of intrusion detection systems capable of active
response is increasing. Axelsson points out that security concerns about the
intrusion detection system itself raise the possibility of the attacker exploiting an
active response to effect a denial of service attack on the systembeing monitored,
or an innocent third party' (Axelsson 2000, p. 13).
According to Amoroso (Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Part I - (network
intrusions; attacksymptoms; IDS tasks; and IDS architecture, 2003)
"Intrusion detection is a process of identifying and responding to malicious
activity targeted at computing andnetworking resources". He mentioned Intrusion
Detection System (abbreviated as IDS) is a defense system, which detects hostile
activities in a network. The key is to detect and possibly prevent activities that
may compromise system security, or a hacking attempt in progress including
reconnaissance/data collection phases that involve for example, port scans. One
key feature of intrusion detection systems is their ability to provide a view of
unusual activity and issue alerts notifying administrators and/or block a suspected
connection. He also stated that IDS tools must be capable of distinguishing
between insider attacks originating from inside of an organization (coming from
own employees or customers) and external ones (attacks and the thread posed by
hackers).
Currently, there exist a lot of intrusion detection systems available to use. One of
the most known systems is Snort. Snort is an open source network intrusion
detection system, capable of performing real-time traffic analysis and packet
logging on IP networks. It can perform protocol analysis, content
searching/matching and canbe usedto detect a variety of attacks and probes, such
as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, OS
fingerprinting attempts, and much more. Snort has three primary uses. It can be
used as a straight packet sniffer like tcpdump(l), a packet logger (useful for
network traffic debugging, etc), or as a full blown network intrusion detection
system. Although Snort has all these capabilities, but still it needs long hour of
training to really master the system. The training must be conducted by a train




There are a lot of methodologies that I could choose. Each methodology
has its own pro's and con's. For this project, I decided to use the Waterfall model
which is best suited to this project. Thismethodology was selected as it suits most
to this project. Other methodology has also been taken into consideration such as
the Spiral model and RAD model. But seeing into complexity and cyclic process
of the methodology makes me decided to choose this methodology. Coping to the
time frame given, I need to have a simple methodology yetefficient and practical
to use in completing the project. As mention earlier, the time given t complete the
project is not sufficient, so everything must go on schedule and as smooth as
possible.
The Waterfall Model is a software development model first proposed in 1970 by
W.W.Royce, in which development is seen as flowing steadily through the phases
of requirements analysis, design, implementation, testing (validation), and
integration and maintenance.
Methodology plays a vital role in completing any project. Waterfall model is used
as the methodology to plan and manage the system development process for this
project. All the phases in the system development life cycle (SDLC) applies to
this model in order to develop the project. The waterfall model consists of 4




d. Implementation & Testing
Figure 3 Waterfall Model
3.1.1 Planning
System planning begins with a formal proposal or request for the project. In this
phase, the purpose is to identify clearly the nature and scope of the business
opportunity or problem by performing preliminary investigation or also called as
feasibility study. The outcome from this study is project scope. This preliminary
investigation is a critical step since the outcome will affect the entire development
process.
At this phase, the project started with the request from the lecturers to submit the
project proposal. As discussed with the supervisor, this topic was selected since it
is an interesting topic to discover. During this stage, proposal was sentto the FYP
committee for approval. Scope ofstudy was also established during this period.
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3.1.2 Analysis
The purpose of this phase is to understand the requirements and build a logical
model for the system. As implemented in this project, this is the phase of doing
research and analysis. Facts, information, data, and findings were collected as
much as possible during this stage.
Research on network intrusion and detection were done aggressively. Several
projects regarding the topic were also analyzed in order to come out with a good
product analysis. At this stage, the preliminary report was sent to the supervisor as
required. The endproduct of this system analysis phase is the system requirement,
which identify the design requirements for the project. The author has also
analyzed a few existing IDS system. Most of them are developed using an open
source. Eg. Snort. This system was developed using UNIX. From observation and
analysis of the system, the author identified a few characteristics that need an
improvement.
3.1.3 Design
In this phase, all necessary outputs, inputs, interfaces, and processes will be
identified. The tools needed for the design phase are prepared and installed. Some
of the tools are free downloaded from Internet such as Java Script. The
development will start with installation of those software and hardware needed to
run the program. Each software was initially analyzed for its compatibility with
the system. The codes were thoroughly checked and debug in order to have a bug
free code.
3.1.4 Implementation and Testing
During implementation phase, the system is constructed. The code are written,
tested, and documented, and the system is installed. At this stage, the full system
will be implemented.
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Development of the system required most of time and effort. The development
phase has to be implemented according to the plan designed earlier in the
planning phase. But, some changes did occurred to suit the problems arised.
Coding and debugging consume a lot of time. The code has to be debugged again
and again.
Testing was done after the installation of the system. Testing phase is very
important as it will show whether the systems is functioning as required. Testing
was done a few times to avoid any missing data. The systems was re-tested a
couple of time. Correction and enhancement implemented according to the test
results.
Then, the systemis delivered as required by the Academic Services committee. At
this phase, the system will be presented to the examiners in order to check
whether it meets the objectives and user expectations. The objectiveof this phase
is to deliver a completely functioning and documented information system. If the
system does not meet the requirement and expectation, it has to be enhanced
again. During this phase, the system evaluation will be conducted to determine
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Figure 4 Traditional Network SecurityModel
In the diagram we see a typical firewall configuration. Packets from the Internet
are filtered to allow connection only to the firewall (and if present the external
web server). It is at this point or gateway that all security checking is aimed,
access lists allowing only certain hosts out (and usually none in) prevents
unauthorized access to our internal network. The granularity of these access lists
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is where all the expertise is in building good firewalls e.g. "allow only web
requests from the sales department PC's out to our suppliers' web host between
9am and 5pm". We could see that no Intrusion Detection system is applied to the
system.
4.2 THE NEED OF INTRUSION DETECTION AFTER NETWORK
SECURITY
A common misunderstanding of network security is that firewalls recognize
attacks and block them. This is not true.
Firewalls are simply a device that shuts off everything, then turns back on only a
few well-chosen items. In a perfect world, systems would already be "locked
down" and secure, and firewalls would be unneeded. The reason we have
firewalls is precisely because security holes are left openaccidentally.
In summary, a firewall is not the dynamic defensive system that users imagine it
to be. In contrast, an IDS is much more of that dynamic system. An IDS does
recognize attacks against the network that firewalls are unable to see.
For example, in April of 1999, many sites were hacked via a bug in ColdFusion.
These sites all had firewalls that restricted access only to the web server at port
80. However, it was the web server that was hacked. Thus, the firewall provided
no defense. On the other hand, an intrusion detection system would have
discovered the attack, because it matched the signature configured in the system.
Another problem with firewalls is that they are only at the boundary to our
network. Roughly 80% of all financial losses due to hacking come from inside the
network. A firewall at the perimeter of the network sees nothing going on inside;
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it only sees that traffic which passes between the internal network and the
Internet.
Some reasons for adding IDS to firewall are:
o Double-checks misconfigured firewalls.
o Catches attacks that firewalls legitimate allow through (such as attacks
against web servers).
o Catches attempts that fail.
o Catches insider hacking.
Hackers are much more capable than we think; the more defenses we have, the
better. And they still won't protect us from the determined hacker. They will,
however, raise the bar on determinationneeded by the hackers.
4.3 MAIN TASKS OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
The main task of intrusion detection systems is defense of a computer system by
detecting an attack and possibly repelling it. Detecting hostile attacks depends on
the number and type of appropriate actions. Intrusion prevention requires a well-
selected combination of "baiting and trapping" aimed at both investigations of
threats. Diverting the intruder's attention from protected resources is another task.
Both the real system and a possible trap system are constantly monitored. Data
generated by intrusion detection systems is carefully examined (this is the main









Figure 5. Intrusion detection system activities
Once an intrusion has been detected, IDS issues alerts notifying administrators of
this fact. The next step is undertaken either by the administrators or the IDS itself,
by taking advantage of additional countermeasures (specific block functions to
terminate sessions, backup systems, routing connections to a system trap, legal
infrastructure etc.) - following the organization's security policy . An IDS is an
element of the security policy.
Among various IDS tasks, intruder identification is one of the fundamental ones.
It can be useful in the forensic research of incidents and installing appropriate
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Figure 6. Intrusion detection system infrastructure




Categorizing Attacks in Two Dimensions
Point of Origin







Table above provides a convenient way of looking at attack categories. We can
see that threats generally are divided between internal and external points of
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origin. Inside the table are relative indications of the seriousness of the
consequences. If an internal user obtains privileges belonging to other users, we
usually can rectify the situation and perhaps take legal action. When someone
outside our network is able to gain super user access into one of our nodes, we
have a catastrophic breakdown in security somewhere. Also, because so many
ways to hide one's identity from the outside exist, the chances of catching the
intruder are slim.
4.4.1 Internal Threats
Statistics from the FBI Crime Lab consistently show that the majority of
computer crime occurs from inside. True, as more people connect to the internet,
he threats from outside increase. Today, most crimes still are committed by
insiders. Or at least outside criminals assisted by insiders. The thefts of millions
of dollars from a major U.S banks was launched from Russia, but collision from
insider makes the task easier. Although some companies do not like to think of
their employees, contractors, or business partners as potential criminals, historical
data encourages them to do so. Below are some of the threats that an insider poses
to internal systems.
a) Internal Denial-of-Service Attack
Recently, a number of NT systems at the University of Texas were hounded
by a denial-of-service attack against the IP stack delivered with NT. The attack
was a variant of the Teardrop UDP attack that was possible because of a bug in
NT. By sending certain type of UDP datagrams, an adversary could cause the
systems to crash. Because UDP packets are often blocked by screening routers or
firewalls, this threat was unlikely from outside sources. Someone with access to
one of the UT labs launched the attack internally.
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Users with accounts on various company servers or on university systems pose
threats because they already have access to the system. When they are able to
establish a login session ona computer, a number of denial-of-service attacks rare
possible:
o Consume all of the disk space in the /tmp directory of UNIX systems to
slow or crash the system (depending on how that particular version of
UNIX handles this condition)
o Write a program to consume all available resources such as all of the
memory buffers allocated for sockets
o Fill up the printer queue directory
o Create a number of concurrent I/O bound processes that thrash the disk
repeatedly
They really don't need an account on a system to cause problems. Physical or
network access is sufficient for locking all accounts with failed login attempts
until the lockout threshold is hit for each account. If the systems permit remote
logins from other nodes inside the enterprise, failed login attacks are possible
even when physical access is not granted.
Most environments run a large number of client-server applications. The telnet is
a well known example. However, numerous proprietary client-server protocols
are running throughout the enterprise, and each of these are also susceptible to
denial-of-service attacks. For example, it is unlikely that many legacy applications
are performing adequate authentication of packets received. Forged IP addresses
and packets can find their way into listening servers and cause denial-of-service
attacks. If the servers are designto accept connections from any internal node, it's
easy to create packets, flood the server with them and thus render the server
useless. In general, the closer they can get to running on the systems directly, the
more damage they can potentially do.
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b) Internal Privilege Escalation
UNIX and NT systems both provide ways for users to gain increased
privileges through program execution. NT uses its access rights mechanism, and
UNIX relies on the now familiar SUID or SGID concepts. Even if the privileged
program does not give the users access to everything on the system, even a little
privilege boost can help. For one thing, if the average UNIX user can gain
privileges of the mail group by exploiting a SGID mail program, then that user
will have access to the mail spool directory. Denial-of-service attacks or worse
are then possible. Privileged programs are compromised in a number ofways;
o The program does not check buffer limits and is subject to a buffer
overflow attack
o The program does not check input parameters and is tricked into executing
one of the parameters as a command
o Theprogram makes invalid assumptions about its environment
o The program is tricked into operating on a different resource because of
poor programming practices.
c) Internal Superuser Privileges
The biggest threat to a system is when a user gains superuser or complete
administrative privileges. The same kind of attacks and problems mentioned
previously apply for root or administrator privileged programs. Buffer overflow
attacks, data driven attacks, spoofed resources, and spoof network packets have
allbeen exploited by normal users to gain privileged access to the systems.
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Will a fire wall prevent these privileges escalations from happening? If the
network attack is like the test.cgi attack and the Web sever is running as root or
administrator, then the firewall will not help.
4.4.2 External Threats
When we have a publicly visible systems, as almost everyone does today,
there is always a threat that someone can find a away into our systems. A system
in the perimeter network is always the first one to be hit. When someone attacks
our systems, the result could be denial of service. For example, our web server
could be slowed considerably if it is hit with a denial-of-service attack. If
someone manages to gain a login shell as a normal user, this represents the next
level of severity in threats. Naturally, if someone obtains complete control over a
system by gaining root or super user privileges, and this adversary is a remote
unaffiliated with our enterprise, this represents the worst threat.
a) External Denial-of-Service Threats
Publicly visible network addresses are nearly impossible to defend from
all denial-of-service attacks. If our web server allows arbitrary users to connect,
someone can write a program to generate a large number of http transactions with
our server as the target. Thenet result is a flooded web server. Mostweb server is
not design to detect or defend against these attacks, although this is precisely the
onlyplace to adequately defend against such a threat.
A firewall or screening router is also not going to be of much help here because it
is difficult to state the packet filtering rule for this condition. Forexample, a large
21
number of http packets with bad data from a single source address are hard to
distinguish from a large number of well-formed http packets unless our filter is
smart enough to know the details of the http protocol and partially assembled
packets. To really solve the problem, the component that has the highest semantic
view of the packets, in other words the web server itself, must implement this
form of application-level security. If the web server detects a series of bogus
packets or even good packets from the same address in a fixed interval of time,
the server could notify the firewall to block incoming traffic from that address. Of
course, the clever denial-of-service attacker would just forge a series of IP
addresses to avoid detection.
b) External Privilege Escalations
o This class of attacks is becoming less frequent as knowledge of security
problems spreads. A remote user can escalate privileges in two different
ways:
o A program that does not permit logins is running on the target node but is
accepting network connections (such as web server).
o The remote user is able to gain access to the systems via a login, or in
other words, a network program is listening for external connections.
An example of the former is, the web server daemon. Poor CGI programming
practices can permit remote users to execute arbitrary command on the system,
albeit only with the privileges of the web server daemon. A rather worse example
surfaced in 1997 with some implementation of FTP.
An FTP client can issue a command to the FTP server that requests multiple files
at once. The client issuing the mget* command is asking the server to send all
files in the current directory of the server. Unfortunately, some FTP client
implementations did not bother to check that the files sent by the server were only
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those included in the current directory. A user in the home directory who then
FTP to a malicious server and executes the mget* command could find many
other files being added to the home directory. The server could push viruses or
TrojanHorses to the receiving clientsbecause of this bug.
4.5 UNDERSTANDING MALICIOUS ACTIVITIES
Malicious traffic ranges from simple probing and scanning to denial-of-
service. Some types of attack are quite easily distinguishable, while others canbe
quite obscure andhard to differentiate from legitimate traffic.
4.5.1 Scanning
Traffic design to map ournetwork and find security weaknesses is by far themost
common type of malicious activity. This traffic, called scanning, takes several
form: network scanning, port scanning, pingscanning, vulnerability scanning, and
etc.all of the different types of scanning can be grouped into two broad types
basedupon purpose: "network scanning" and"port scanning".
The purpose of scanning is to determine what systems or services our system is
running. Scans can be broad, with the intent of mapping out our entire network
and services, or they can be specifically targeted to determine whether any of our
computer systemsare susceptible to a particular vulnerability.
4.5.2 Network Scanning
Network scanning generally seeks to determine several things: what IP
addresses are actively used, what services are running on those active systems and
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what specific versions of the services are running. To determine what IP
addresses are in use, attackers use one of the two techniques — ICMP Echo
Request andTCP/UDP (User datagram Protocol) connections.
Network scanning cannot be effectively prevented, but it can be hindered
somewhat. ICMP (Internet Control message Protocol) is used for most types of
network scanning to speed up the determination of whether the target host should
be scanned in more detail. Blocking the ICMP packets will slow down some
scanning. ICMP blocking is usually accomplished by filtering ICMP packets at
either the border router or the firewall. By blocking ICMP, we force the remote
user to perform a blind connect. A blind connect is simply an attempted TCP
connection used to determine whether the host is active. Forcing a remote system
to use blind connects significantly slows down the scanning process.
4.5.3 Port Scanning
An attacker is rarely interested in just a list of the systems we are running. Port
scanning is the process of attempting to connect to ports in order to see if a device
is running. Most popular port scanners attempt to make detection more difficult
by randomizing the order of the ports tested for. Opening ports in a random order
was sufficient to fool many of the earliest IDS software programs. This
randomization doesn't affect many intrusion detection programs anymore because
this randomization technique is well known.
One other way an attacker does is by manipulating the SOCKS port on user's
machine. SOCKS is a system that allows multiple machines to share a common
Internet connection. The reason that attackers scan for this is because a large
percentage of users misconfigure SOCKS.
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Figure 7
Many products support SOCKS. A typical product for home users is WinGate,
which is installed on a single machine that actually connects to the Internet. All
the other machines within the home connect to the Internet through the machine
running WinGate.
A misconfigured SOCKS permits arbitrary the sources and destinations. Just as it
allows internal machines access to the Internet, it will allow external machines to
access the internal home network. Most importantly, it may allow a attacker
access to other Internet machines through your system. This allows the attacker to
hide his/her true location.
IRC chat servers will often scan clients for open SOCKS servers. They will kick
off such people witha message indicating howto fix the problem. If you receive
such a message, then you can check the client to see if it is a WinGate bot
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performing such a check. A false-positive may occur if an application is
temporarily unavailable. In this case, it will look like your internal machines are
"attacking" the SOCKS server.
4.5.4 Brute Force
Probably, the most easily detected type of attack, and the most inelegant,
is a brute force attack. Brute Force attacks are commonly used in an attempt to
discover username and password combinations for exposed services. Brute force
attacks usually cause a noticeable increase in traffic and a high number of
connections.
Brute force attack is a good example of the type of activity that can occur
legitimately, as well as in attack. A legitimate user trying several passwords
because he or she forgot her password would look very similar. The biggest
differentiator in most cases is the volume. A true attacker will likely try hundreds
ofpasswords, whereas a legitimate user will usually try only a handful.
4.5.5 Buffer Overflows
In basic terms, buffer overflow works by sending data that exceed the
amount of space provided in memory for the data. The extra data overflows into
other memory areas of the computer system. If the data being sent is carefiilly
crafted by an attacker, the data canbe use to effectively 'patch' a running system
with the attacker's desired program code. Overflows are generally used to
effectively either to create denial-of-service or to inject external code into the
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systems. The additional code usually provides a backdoor for the attacker to enter
the system.
4.5.6 Applications Attacks
Application attacks, as the name implies, targeted at specific applications.
An attack against a web server will connect to the web service and use the
application protocol (in caseof web, HTTP) to perpetrate the attack.
Each specific application attack is unique in nature and thus requires an equally
specific detector. General detectors for application attacks are difficult to
construct. Specific detectors for eachattack are usually straightforward to create.
4.5.7 Denial of Service
Denial-of-service attacks are designed to interfere with legitimate user's
ability to use their computer systems and services. Denial-of-service usually takes
one of two broad forms. They either use flooding to exceed capacity, or they
exploit a bug of some sort to crash specific services.
From technical perspective, flooding attacks are easiest to execute. A typical
flood might use several systems with connections to highbandwidth to inundate a
target host with millionsof packets. Successful flooding requires access to enough
systems and bandwidth to exceed the capacity of the target. This becomes more
difficult to arrange as the target's capacity increases.
Denial-of-service attacks that exploit bugs are a little more difficult to construct,
but require only single system with reasonable connectivity to execute the attack.
Once the tool for exploiting particular bugs has been written, the attack software
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usually propagates quickly among attackers. It is only a matter of time before a
program for executing particular DOS attacks is readily available.
Both flooding and denial-of-service attacks produce patterns that can be readily
detected on the network. The same detectors that detect port scans can be used to
detect flooding attacks. Bug-based denial-of-service attacks are typically unique
and require their own signature.
4.5.8 Disinformation Attacks
This is one of the sneakiest uses of redirection. Domain name System
(DNS) spoofing is an example of such an attack. Many DNS server do not
authenticate DNS resolutions responses. Any DNS query response sent to a
vulnerable server is cached as if the server had requested the information. As an
example, if I want to redirect mail between Company A and Company B to my
own mail server, Company C, I can send a spoofed MX address with my own
mail server IP address (C) to Company A's DNS server. Any time Company A
sends an email to Company B, the email will be redirected to my mail server. My
mail server can then be configured to forward a copy of the mail to the real
Company B mail server. This attack is perpetrated using a single spoofed UDP
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Figure 9. Onset ofCode Red I v2, Code Red II, and Nimda: Number of remote hosts launching
confirmed attacks corresponding to different worms, as seen at the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory. Hosts are detected by the distinct URLs theyattempt to retrieve, corresponding to the
IIS exploits and attack strings. Since Nimda spreads by multiple vectors, the counts shown for it
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Figure 10 . The endemic nature of Internet worms: Number of remote hosts launching
confirmed attacks corresponding to different worms, as seen at the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, over several months since their onset. Since July, 139,000 different remote Code
RedI hosts have been confirmed attacking LBNL; 125,000 different Code RedII hosts; and
63,000 Nimda hosts. Of these, 20,000 wereobserved to be infected with two different worms, and
1,000 with all three worms. (Again, Nimda is potentially an underestimate because we are only
counting those launching Web attacks.)
For purposes of attack classification, worms such as Nimda and Code Red, or the
more recent SQLSnake, can be best thought of as automated combination attacks.
These worms start by scanning for vulnerable hosts and then proceed to use an
application attack to compromise the system. After the system is compromised,
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the worms transfer a copy of their code into the target system. This newly
compromised computer then begins the cycle over by starting to scan for more
vulnerable hosts to propagate.
Worms such as Nimda and Code Red presents two issues for intrusion detection.
During the initial few days of the worm propagation, the number of alerts
generated is staggering. We might see in excess of tenfold our normal alerts, often
as much as 100-fold. The second problem for IDS in relation to these worms is
that the alerts never completely go away. After the initial few weeks, when the
majority of sites have patched their systems to stop the spread, we will still
receive a steady background flow of alerts. This continual flow of alerts is due to
the fact that it is almost impossible for worms like these to completely die out.
These worms are designed to infectdefault installations of software and operating
systems. Given the sizeand diversity of the Internet, there are always a smattering
vulnerable systemattachedand functioning at any given time. Couple of existence
of vulnerable systems with a lack of appropriate technical expertise at far too
many companies attached to the internet and the result is an inability to rid the
Internet of worms once they are loose.
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4.6 DEPLOYMENT OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
4.6.1 Network Hosts
Even though network intrusion detection systems have traditionally been
used as probes, they can also be placed on hosts (in non-promiscuous mode).
Take for example a switched network where an employee is on the same switch as
the CEO, who runs Win98. The windows machine is completely defenseless, and
has no logging capabilities that could be fed to a traditional host-based intrusion
detection system. The employee could run a network-based password cracker for
months without fear of being caught. A NIDS installed like virus scanning
software is the most effective way to detect such intrusions.
4.6.2 Network Perimeter
IDS is most effective on the network perimeter, such as on both sides of
the firewall, near the dial-up server, and on links to partner networks. These
links tend to be low-bandwidth (Tl speeds) such that an IDS can keep up with the
traffic.
4.6.3 WAN Backbone
Another high-value point is the corporate WAN backbone. A frequent
problem is hacking from "outlying" areas to the main corporate network. Since
WAN links tend to be low bandwidth, IDS systems can keep up.
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4.6.4 Server Farms
Serves are often placed on their own network, connected to switches. The
problem these servers have, though, is that IDS systems cannot keep up with
high-volume traffic. For extremely important servers, you may be able to install
dedicate IDS systems that monitor just the individual server's link. Also,
application servers tend to have lower traffic than file servers, so they are better
targets for IDS systems.
4.6.5 LAN Backbones
IDS systems are impractical for LAN backbones, because of their high
traffic requirements. Some vendors are incorporating IDS detection into switches.
A full IDS system that must reassemble packets is unlikely to keep up. A scaled-




After detecting any of the malicious attacks on our network, now we come to
the phase where we have to response to the situation. The principal elements of
response may include notification, blocking, isolation, or resort to law
enforcement.
4.7.1 Notification
Most response plans stipulate notification steps for informing the affected
systems and their administrators and users. A primary purpose of notification is to
allow the affected individual to respond and recover from the attack as quickly as
possible. Recovery is aided significantly by obtaining as much detail as possible
about everything that occurred during the attack.
4.7.2 Blocking
One broad response to an attack is block traffic from the attack source.
Blocking is always accomplished through a rule in the firewall. At a simple level,
we should consider placing at least one IDS sensor outside the blocking
mechanism. This gives us the ability to continue tracking the activities of the
attacker. If the attacker has compromised additional systems in our network, for
example, the attacker might attempt to communicate with those systems when the
connectivity with the target of the attack is lost. The action taken by the attacker
after implementing the blocking can provide valuable information to assisting the




If we want to allow the attacker to continue their activities for purposes of
study, or gathering evidence for legal prosecution, we have to isolate the activity
as much as possible to prevent harm to other systems. An attacker can cause
additional harm to our systems as well as other systems on the Internet if not
contained. As in the case of notification, additional information gathering
mechanisms potentially provided by the IDS systems can significantly enhance
this isolation process.
4.7.4 Law enforcement/Internet body communication
For some attacks, our response plan may indicate that we are to provide law
enforcement or Internet groups such as Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT) with the information gathered by our IDS systems. If law enforcement
involved, the data must be handled in a specific manner in order to be useful as
legal evidence. The details of handling requirements vary somewhat from state to
state. In most cases, the actual system drives are usually used as the primary
source of evidence rather than primary logs, although this may partly due to the
lack of widely use IDS as mush as anything else. We should consult legal counsel
to insure our procedures meet with local legal requirements.
There are several organizations with which we could consider sharing our attack
data. The internet is a global network. The attack being used against our network
is almost definitely being use against others as well. By sharing information, we
can assist proactively finding and preventing attacks. Several groups have been
set up to take attack information and make it accessible to others to help prevent
attacks.
DShield.org rwww.dshield.org) collects firewall and IDS systems logs and uses
them to analyze what sort of attacks are occurring and where they are coming
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from. DShield.org will even contact the sources of malicious activity on our
behalf if we wish it to. DShield.org provides an updated "top 20" source of
attacks that can be used to provide an ongoing blocking of the current worst
abusers of security. It also provides several tools and clients for making
submission of log information quick and easy.
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4.8 SNAPSHOT OF WORKING PRODUCT
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Figure 11. Main page showing the IDS is detecting all connection that is
currently running in the network.
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Figure 12. Main page showing only anactive connection detected bythe IDS.
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Figure 13. The Host name of the active IP address detected will be shown after
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Figure 14. IP address/hostname detected that tries to flood the network will
block by the systems administrator.
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Figure 15. The blocked IP address/host will be listed in the Filter section. In this
section Systems Administrator could manually insert the threatening IP address
andalso re-allow particular IP addresses that havebeenblocked.
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<9eeeion :: Start: 1 0/1 6/04. 11:1 7:07 PM End: 1 0/1 6/04 11:1 7:23 PM>
ICMP Echo Requests: 0 Echo Replies: 8 11:1 7:07 PM
[ Listening For Connection ] 1 35 n\a LISTENING 11:1 7:08 PM
[ Lictcning For Connection ] 1 026 n\a LISTENING 11:1 7:08 PM
[ Listening For Connection ] 1029 n\a LISTENING 11:17:08 PM
[ Listening For Connection ] 37907n\a LISTENING 11:1 7:08 PM
I Listening For Connection ] 1 020 n\a LISTENING- 11:1 7:08 PM
[ Listening For Connection ] 1 027 n\a LISTENING 11:1 7:08 PM
[ Listening For Connection ] 1 028 nte LISTENING 11:1 7:08 PM
[ Listening For connection ] 137 ma listening i i n 7:08 PM
[ Listening For Connection ] 1 38 nAa LISTENING 11:1 7:08 PM
[ Listening For Connection ] 139 n\a LISTENING 11:1 7:08 PM
^Session Start 10/1 7/04 1 03 12 PM End 1 0/1 7/04 119 19 PM>
HeO 0 110 210 1030 6667 ESTABLISHED 1 03 12 PM
ICMP Echo Requests 0 Echo Replies 5 1 03 13 PM
Figure 17. Logfile is savedforfurther inspections andean be viewed by clicking
the View Log button.
4.9 SYSTEM TESTING
In ensuring the IDS system is working as required, testing hasto be implemented.
One Web Server was installed and set up for the testing purposes. This web server
will run a portal. In this case, the author has developed a simple portal called UTP
Industrial Internship Training portal. This portal will be used by UTP students
that are currently undergoing their Industrial Internship. All the latest important
information will be uploaded in the portal. This portal is very important for those
students as this will be their main source to get the latest information from the
academic services department.
The IDS system is installed in the web server that runs the portal. The IDS will
always monitor the data request from user. This is where the IDS systems will
play his part.
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Portal is one of the most vulnerable and easiest systems to be hacked. Differs
from critical systems suchas e-banking thathave a higher levelof security.
One of the most common type of malicious activity is Brute Force attack (refer
page 22). The IDS system will always list the entire request from users. From the
request connection detected by the IDS, systems administrator could determine
whether that request is from a normal user or from other people with bad
intentions.
Systems admin could verify whether the request is from a deterministic hacker.
One simple example is in the Log In page. If a normal user that forgot his/her
password, normally they will trya few possible passwords in their mind. This will
normally run for 3 to 5 times before they give up. But, for a deterministic hacker,
they will try for thousands of times until they get the correct password. This
attack will cause a noticeable increase in traffic and a high number of
connections.
This large volume of request will be detected by the IDS system. When the threat
is detected, the systems admin couldblock or terminate the connection instantly.
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Figure 19. Portal main page after a successful log in.
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4.10 CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE INTRUSION DETECTION
SYSTEM
Intrusion Detection technology has quite a way to go to achieve a plug and
play implementation. There are still many challenges to achieve effective
intrusion detection systems. Fortunately, these challenges can be overcome with
some work. The major challenges facing IDS include the following:
4.10.1 Alert Handling
Easily the biggest challenge faced by mostorganization is alert handling. Until an
intrusion detection system is properly tuned to a specific environment, there can
be literally thousands of alerts generated on a daily basis. Unfortunately, because
we can't determine whether an alert is false or positive until after the alert has
been investigated, we must sort through all of the alerts. The expertise and
manpower required to handle alerts can be quite daunting.
4.10.2 False Alerts
Most of the intrusion detection systems generate a large number of false alerts.
Ratios of four, five pr even ten false alerts for every real alert are quite common.
4.10.3 Evasion
An increasing numbers of attackers' understands the shortcomings of some of the
intrusion detection technology, such as signature based IDS. An attackers
understands the weaknesses, their attacks are design to bypass detection.
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4.10.4 Unknown Attacks
Although IDS is reasonably good at finding known attacks, new and unknown
attacks are not well detected by most intrusion detection systems, if they are
detected at all.
4.10.5 Architectural Issues
Technology such as switches, Gigabit Ethernet and encryption make network-
based intrusion detection much more challenging.
4.10.6 Resource Requirements
Successfully implementing Intrusion detection requires a non trivial investment
in resources. The time investment required to properly utilize intrusion detection
is substantial. The dollar cost to implement intrusion detection systems can be
kept reasonably low by using open source solutions such as Snort, but those
savings are usually offset in the time to invest to master and maintainthe intrusion
detection systems. Using commercial product for intrusion detection systems will
usuallyreduce the time commitment required but by no means eliminates it.
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In addition to these current challenges, there are several areas of intrusion
detection in which improvement would significantly enhance the value and
usefulness of intrusion detection.
4.10.7 Reporting
Consolidated and truly useful reporting from most IDS packages is noticeably
lacking.
4.10.8 Visualization
Tools for visualizing activity in process to enhance understanding and responses
would be useful.
4.10.9 Correlation
Tighter correlation of activities between various sensors and actual network
conditions would yield many benefits such as reduced false alerts, better
understanding of attack severity and increased detection.
4.10.10 Vulnerability Assessment
Cross-referencing attack information with current systems configurations and
vulnerabilities allows us to determine severity and ramifications of attacks much
better.
4.10.11 Data Mining




After a few weeks of research and studies, I managed to clarify the criteria
needed to develop good intrusion detection systems. These criteria are gathered
from various research studies, research paper books, the internet and also my
understanding of the network security environment.
4.11.1 Ability to Identify Attacks
The main performance requirement of a IDS is to detect intrusions.
However the definition of an intrusion is currently unclear. In particular, many
vendors and researchers appear to consider any attempt to place malicious traffic
on the network as an intrusion.
In reality a more useful system will log malicious traffic and only inform the
operator if the traffic posses a serious threat to the security of the target host.
Snort is tending towards this direction with the use of alert classification ranging
from 1 to 10. With 1 representing a point of interest only and 10 representing a
major threat to security.
4.11.2 Known vulnerabilities and attacks
All IDSs should be capable of detecting known vulnerabilities. However
research (Allen 2000), (NSS 2001) indicates that many commercial IDS fail to
detect recently discovered attacks. On the other hand if a vulnerability or attack is
known all systems should be patched, or workarounds applied thus the need for an
IDS to detect these events will be removed. Unfortunately the reality is that many
systems are not patched or upgraded as vulnerabilities are discovered.
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4.11.3 Unknown attacks
This must be the most important feature of any IDS. It is the IDS that can
detect attacks that are not yet known which will justify its implementation. New
vulnerabilities are discovered every day. By its very nature these are also the most
difficult attacks to detect.
4.11.4 Relevance of attacks
This refers to the ability of the IDS to identify the relative importance of
any attack. For an example, given the use of a windows exploit on a UNIX system
is not of high importance. However if the alert is raised, and the analyst must
investigate every alert, a mechanism should be available to distinguish the
relevance of different alerts.
4.11.5 Stability, Reliability and Security
Any IDS should be able to continue consistently operate in all
circumstances. The application and operating system should be capable of
running for years without segmentation faults or memory leakage.
An important function of IDS is to consistently report identical events in the same
manner. One disadvantage of a product using signature recognition is the ability
of different users to configure different alerts to provide different messages. Thus
traffic on one network may trigger a different alert to the same traffic on another
system of the same type. A number of efforts are currently underway to solve this
problem. Both security focus and CVE provide databases of known
vulnerabilities, and exploits targeting them.
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The system should also be able to withstand attempts to compromise it. If an
attacker can identify IDS on a network it could prove to be a valuable asset. It is
also possible the attacker will attempt to disable the system using DoS or DDoS
techniques. The system should be able to withstand all of these types of attack.
4.11.6 Information provided to analyst
The information provided to the analyst when alert is raised should be
enough to clearly identify the reason the event causing the event to be raised, and
the reason this event is of interest. It should also provide links to vulnerability
databases, such as bugtraq or CVE to assist the analyst in determining the
relevance and appropriate reaction to a particular alert.
4.11.7 Identify target and source
The alert should also identify the source of the alert and the target system.
Further information such as a whois or DNS lookup on a IP address would be also
be beneficial.
4.11.8 Severity, potential damage
Identification of the potential severity of an attack. Some alerts are
triggered by events to relate to information gathering, such as port scanning.
Although this information may be relevant if a more serious attack in launched
the volume of scanning that occurs on the internet makes it impractical to
investigate every time a network is scanned. On the other hand indication that a
local host has been compromised by a Trojan should be given higher priority.
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4.11.9 Outcome of attack (Success or failure)
Another useful (although currently non existent) feature of an IDS should
be to indicate the outcome of an attack. In most cases, alert simply indicates that
an attempthas been made. It is then the responsibility of the analyst to search for
correlating activity to indicate the outcome of the attack. If an IDS were to present
the analyst with a list of other alerts generated by the target host, and a summary
of other (non alert) traffic the evaluation of the outcome could be greeted
accelerated.
4.11.10 Legal validity of data collected
The legal validity of the data collected by any IDS is of extreme
importance if any legal will be taken against the attacker. A disturbingly large
number of systems do not collect the actual network packets; instead they simply
record their own interpretation of events. A more robust system will also capture
and store the network traffic, as well as raising the alert.
4.11.11 Manageability
One of the greatest risks of IDS is that once the system is implemented it
will not be utilized to its full capabilities. Often the reason for this is due to the
complexity of configuring and maintaining the system. It is also important that
IDS can be optimizedfor a particular network. There is no point in monitoring for
web server exploits if there is not a web server on the network.
4.11.12 Ease or complexity of configuration
Unfortunately the usability of a system is usually inversely proportional to
the flexibility and customizability of that system. The desire for flexibility can
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configurable of the system will be determined by the users of the system, the
network in which it will be operating and the level of functionality required from
the system.
If the system is to be maintained by a network administrator who is also
responsible for standard network management he or she is unlikely to have the
time available to optimize and configure the system so usability will be a primary
consideration. On the other hand if an intrusion analyst if employed specifically to
manage intrusion detection a more complex system with greater functionality may
be desired.
4.11.13 Possible configuration options
The IDS should be capable of being optimized for the systems on the
network. As mentioned earlier there is no point in performing http analysis if a
web server is not operating on the network under inspection. The level of traffic
on the network will also determine the intensity of analysis performed. A simple
system suitable for a single network segment with low traffic will be able to
combine the sensor and analysis functions within the single unit. A network with
high levels of traffic may need to separate the sensor and analysis functions across
different hosts.
There are also a number of other configuration options that may apply to
particular situations. For example in some situations the IDS (i.e. analyst) may not
be allowed to view the contents of packets on the network. In this case it should
be possible to configure the DIS to only examine (and store) the header
information from the packets.
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4.11.14 Scalability and Interoperability
a) Scalability
Most organizations grow and expand over time. As they expand so do their
supporting infrastructure, include computer networks. Any IDS should be capable
of expanding with the network. As new network segments are added new IDS
may also be needed. Will it be possible to consolidate the reports from multiple
IDS into a single user interface? Another important question will be the storage of
this information. If a small network is monitored data storage may be possible in
flat files. However as the amount of data collected grows it may be necessary to
transfer this data storage into a database.
b) Interoperability
Research has proven that the most effective intrusion detection requires
correlating information from a range of sources. This includes NIDS, HIDS,
system logs, firewall logs and any other information sources available. At the time
of writing the Intrusion Detection Working Group (IDWG) had submitted a
number of documents defining standards for communication between IDSs. It is
expected that these will be released as RFCs in the near future.
Once these standards are implemented any IDS using the standard protocols will
be able to communicate with and other IDS. This will enable an organization to




The level of vendor support required in an implementation will be
determined by the skill levels of the staff implementing the system. However as
staff turnover rates are common in the IT industry it is worthwhile considering the
level of support that is available from the vendor.
4.11.16 Signature updates
Any signature based IDS is dependant upon it signatures to detect intrusions. The
ability of these systems to detect new or even modified intrusions has been shown
to be poor (Allen 2000). In order for these systems to be effective updated
signatures must be available as new vulnerabilities and exploits are discovered.
Many signature based systems now allow the operator to create their own
signatures. This can allow the system to monitor for new alerts as they are
discovered without relying on the vendor to supply updates. However monitoring
vulnerabilities and writing signatures as they occur is a demanding task. Consider




Selecting and implementing IDS is a challenging task. There are a number
of factors to be considered, and these factors will change from situation to
situation. In order to ensure a successful implementation an organization should
determine its requirements and then locate a system that meets them.
Experienced security professionals realize the value of the triad prevention,
detection and response (Smaha and Winslow, 1994). One of the best defenses is
to build formidable preventive mechanisms. However, in practice, prevention
alone is insufficient. Programs bugs and human errors have resulted in numerous
security breaches in the past.
A security policy must be monitored for violations. That is, we want to detect any
security breaches that are caused by configuration problems or slack policies.
Finally, because security solutions must scale, it must be possible to define
automated responses to security incidents. Care is, of course, needed. We do not
want a response policy that tries to terminate all of the processes running on
behalf of the perpetrator, especially if this affects availability of resources that are
crucial to us.
Intrusion detection can be extremely valuable tool when implemented correctly.
Understanding the practical limitations as well as the capabilities of the
technology will enable us to achieve the best results. Understanding the history of
intrusion detection helps to reinforce what we can expect to gain from intrusion
detection. As the technology improves, we can harness the increase in capabilities
to the best advantage.
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